The constitutional framework governing Perikatan Nasional would make it legally difficult to unilaterally expel Bersatu or strip it of parliamentary representation without following strict procedural safeguards, according to Marzuki Mohamad, a former political adviser to Muhyiddin Yassin. His comments underscore the complexity underlying recent tensions within the opposition coalition and highlight the structural protections embedded in the pact's founding documents.

Marzuki contended that PN's constitution explicitly mandates unanimous approval from the coalition's presidential council before any member party faces disciplinary measures or experiences changes to its allocated seats. This requirement effectively grants any single member party—including Bersatu itself—veto power over actions targeting another coalition partner, creating a check against arbitrary domination by larger or more powerful factions within the alliance.

The assertion carries particular weight given ongoing speculation about Bersatu's future within PN. The party, which Muhyiddin leads, has faced mounting pressure from within the coalition, with various figures hinting at possible expulsion procedures or forced restructuring. Understanding the constitutional obstacles to such moves is essential for predicting the coalition's trajectory and determining whether internal disputes might lead to formal ruptures or negotiated compromises.

PN itself comprises multiple parties with distinct ideological orientations and regional power bases. Beyond Bersatu, the coalition includes PAS, which dominates several East Coast states, and smaller partners such as Gerakan and Warisan. This diverse membership means that any attempt to discipline or remove a significant faction without proper constitutional process risks destabilising the entire structure, particularly as Malaysia's political landscape remains fragmented across federal, state, and parliamentary lines.

Marzuki's emphasis on the unanimity requirement reflects a deliberate design choice in PN's founding architecture. When the coalition formally registered in 2020 following the collapse of Pakatan Harapan, its architects sought to prevent any single dominant party from controlling the alliance's machinery or arbitrarily marginalising smaller partners. The unanimous consent principle acknowledges that each member party negotiated specific terms regarding representation, policy influence, and coalition governance in exchange for joining PN.

For Malaysian observers, the constitutional interpretation carries practical implications for the stability of parliamentary politics. If such unanimous approval requirements are truly binding, then Bersatu enjoys substantial protection against expulsion, even if other PN leaders voice public criticisms or privately discuss removing the party. This structural reality may explain why, despite recurring tensions and rhetorical volleys, formal expulsion measures have not materialised—the procedural hurdles are simply too high.

The regional dimension also matters. Bersatu commands significant support in certain constituencies and retains organisational capacity across several states. Removing such a faction from the coalition would not merely reduce PN's seat count in parliament; it would fundamentally alter the geographic and demographic composition of the opposition alliance, potentially strengthening Pakatan Harapan by offering Bersatu a negotiating platform or encouraging defections to other blocs.

However, constitutional provisions do not necessarily prevent creative reinterpretations or the advancement of alternative arguments by PN's other components. Political actors dissatisfied with the unanimity rule could attempt to circumvent it through revised constitutions, rebranding exercises, or other procedural manoeuvres. Marzuki's claim, while legally grounded, thus represents one interpretation of PN's governance framework rather than an absolute legal guarantee—particularly in Malaysia's fluid political environment, where constitutional amendments and novel interpretations occasionally overcome structural obstacles.

The broader context involves ongoing negotiations about PN's direction and composition. Beyond Bersatu's status, questions persist regarding the coalition's relationship with UMNO-led Barisan Nasional, the viability of state-level coalitions versus national alignment, and the ideological coherence necessary to function as a genuine political force rather than a mere electoral vehicle. These larger strategic questions inevitably shape discussions about individual member parties and their privileges.

Marzuki's intervention into this debate suggests that at least some observers within Muhyiddin's political orbit remain attentive to the legal and constitutional arguments surrounding PN's structure. By publicly asserting that expulsion requires unanimous approval, he signals that Bersatu would contest any unilateral action, potentially mobilising legal expertise and invoking PN's founding documents to resist pressure. This rhetorical stance itself constrains other coalition members' options and raises the political cost of attempting to remove Bersatu through non-consensual means.

For Southeast Asian political analysts, PN's constitutional arrangement illustrates broader challenges facing opposition coalitions in Malaysia and neighbouring democracies. Balancing the need for cohesive political messaging with the reality of internally diverse membership—featuring parties with distinct regional bases, ideological commitments, and electoral interests—requires sophisticated institutional design. PN's unanimity rule represents one such design choice, though its enforceability ultimately depends on political will and the broader power distribution among member parties.

Moving forward, Bersatu's continued participation in PN will likely depend less on strict constitutional enforcement than on the party's perceived electoral value and Muhyiddin's political leverage. Nevertheless, Marzuki's constitutional argument provides a baseline position from which Bersatu can negotiate, resist pressure, and claim legitimacy within the coalition framework. As Malaysian politics continues evolving, such constitutional safeguards may prove decisive in determining whether opposition coalitions survive or splinter.